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OPTIMAL TAXATION AND NORMALISATIONS
Abstract
There still seems to be some confusion about the consequences of normalisations in the
optimal taxation literature. We claim that:
1) Normalisations do not matter for the real solution of optimal taxation problem.
2) Normalisations do matter for good characterisations of the solutions to optimal taxation
problems.
Whereas the first point is uncontroversial, the second one is less well understood. There is
also a need to distinguish between the following senses of taxation of endowment:
1) The taxation of own consumption of initial endowments (e.g. leisure).
2) The taxation of the sale of initial endowments (e.g. labour).
By postponing the normalisation of consumer prices, we detail how normalisations of
consumer prices affect the characterisation of optimal  commodity taxes, derive the preferred
characterisation, and show how it depends on the normalisation. On the way, we discuss the
effect of normalisations on measures of the marginal efficiency loss of taxation.
JEL Code: H21.
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 1 Introduction
There still seems to be some confusion about the the role of normalisations in
the optimal taxation literature, even with perfect competition, complete markets
and full information. We set out to clarify this matter, and claim that, with all
income generated by endowments:
1. Normalisations do not matter for the real solution of optimal taxation
problem.1
2. Normalisations do matter for (good) characterisations of the solutions to
optimal taxation problems.
The ￿rst point is uncontroversial. I think the second one is also fairly obvious.
The idea is clari￿ed by an analogy with the view (analogous to the normalisa-
tion) of a (3-dimensional) object (analogous to the solution). For such objects,
it is clear that: 1) The view does not change the object. 2) The view is impor-
tant for seeing the essential properties of the object. In our case the homogenity
of demand in consumer prices introduces one degree of freedom in choosing the
￿view￿on the solution.
We support this distinction by showing in detail how normalisations a⁄ect
the characterisation, and arrive at a canonical (preferred) normalisation.
One also needs to distinguish between two kinds of taxation of leisure:
1. The taxation of own consumption of initial endowments (e.g. leisure).
2. The taxation of the sale of initial endowments (e.g. labour).
In standard optimal taxations models, untaxed own consumption of initial en-
dowments is usually what makes ￿rst-best unattainable, and thus a basic trait
of the models. On the other hand, untaxed sales of initial endowments is only
a normalisation of consumer prices, though, as we will argue, the canonical
one. More speci￿cally, we claim that, as long as there are no pro￿t in the
economy, consumer prices should be normalised so that the tax income from
initial endowments is zero at the optimum. This is of course a straightforward
generalisation of the standard case, where leisure is the only endowment and
labour is untaxed. Using this normalisation, we arrive at a generalised inverse
elastisity rule, generalising slightly the characterisation in Deaton (1979). The
rule says that one should tax complements to the initial endowments harder.
The intuitive explanation is that doing this is an indirect way of introducing a
tax on the own consumption of endowments.
The assumption of perfect competition is important, for, as noted by Gab-
szewicz and Vial (1972), with imperfect competition the price normalization
also matters for the real solution of the taxation problem. Additionally, one
are usually not able to solve such general equilibrium models without making a
normalization.
In the following, after discussing some of the literature, we ￿rst set up the
commodity tax model, then makes our simple points concerning the second
1This presupposes demand and supply functions which are homogenous of degree 0 in
consumer and producer prices. If not, Dixit and Munk (1977) show that normalisations also
matter for the real solution.
2distinction using the homogeneity of demand. Finally, we detail how the nor-
malisation of consumer prices a⁄ect the characterisation of optimal commodity
taxes, and arrive at our canonical normalisation.
1.1 Some examples from the literature
Are not these two distinctions well-known? In one sense they are, as most people
use the appropriate normalisations and the resulting intuitive interpretations.
People explicitly discussing normalisations in an optimal taxation context, how-
ever, tend to miss at least the ￿rst distinction, as I will try to show. Otherwise,
however, this article build on the work of the people we criticise here, as the
model presentation is only a slight variation of that of Deaton (1979) and Auer-
bach (1987).
Myles Myles in his textbook (1995, p. 122-123) seems to claim that interpre-
tations should be independent of normalisations:
It has been shown that in an economy with constant returns to scale,
consumer and producer prices can be normalised separately and that
the standard procedure is to make one good the numeraire and set
its consumer and producer prices equal. This normalisation also has
the e⁄ect of setting the tax on that good to zero. The latter fact is
clearly seen to be of no consequence whatsoever since the zero tax
is just a result of the normalisation rule. In particular, the zero tax
carries no implications about the nature of the good nor about the
ability to tax that good. This follows since the good with zero tax
can be chosen arbitrarily from the set of available goods.
The ￿no consequences whatsoever￿might indicate that he misses the ￿rst dis-
tinction above, but this is not clear. He continues:
Unfortunately, this reasoning has not been as clearly appreciated in
some of the literature as it should have been. The reason for this has
been the convention, as adopted in sections 3 and 4 of this chapter,
of taking labour as the untaxed commodity. Since labour is often
viewed as the negative of leisure, it has been inferred from this that,
since leisure cannot be measured in the same way that purchases of
other commodities can, the zero tax on leisure is a restriction on the
permissible tax system brought about by an inability to tax leisure.
In addition, the further inference is usually made that the optimal
tax system aims to overcome the missing tax on leisure by taxing
goods complementary to leisure.
Here the second distinction between the two types of taxation of leisure seems
to be lost. He continues:
Particular examples of this are found in Corlett and Hague (1953)
￿ By taxing those goods complementary with leisure, one is to some
extent taxing leisure itself￿(p. 26) and Layard and Walters (1978)
￿ The theory of second best tells us that it we cannot tax leisure, we
can do better than by taxing all other goods, equiproportionately￿
3(p. 184). Many other instances of similar statements could easily be
given. This, of course, is a false interpretation. When real restric-
tions upon the permissible range of tax instruments are introduced
the results obtained are a⁄ected. A number of such restrictions are
considered in Munk (1980) where it is shown that the resulting op-
timal tax structure is sensitive to the precise restrictions imposed.
Here he seems to infer that interpretations based on a speci￿c normalisation
is illegitimate, and thus our ￿rst distinction is lost. Further down the same
page he continues mixing up the di⁄erence between the two types of taxation
of leisure:
A further mistake that has arisen in this context can be found in
Dixit (1970) and Lerner (1970). In a single-household economy, any
required revenue can be raised most e¢ ciently by a lump-sum tax
on the household equal to the value of the revenue. Noticing this,
it has been suggested that a set of commodity taxes which raise
the price of all goods by the same proportion will have the same
e⁄ect as the lump-sum tax and therefore that when all goods can
be taxed, the optimal system has the same proportional tax on all
goods. This conclusion is clearly in contrast to that of the Ram-
sey rule. The mistake in the reasoning was pointed out by Sandmo
(1974) who demonstrated that such a proportional tax system would
raise no revenue. This follows since households both demand goods
and supply labour. A proportional tax then taxes demands but sub-
sidises supplies and, since the value of household demand equals the
value of supply, the proportional tax is just o⁄set by the propor-
tional subsidy. E⁄ectively, the proportiona1 tax on all commodities
is just a rescaling of the consumer price vector which does not a⁄ect
household choices.
Here, the ￿rst claim, attributed to Dixit and Lerner, is true for an equal (value)
tax on all consumption, including own consumption of initial endowments (e.g.
leisure), whereas the second claim, attributed to Sandmo, is valid for an equal
value tax on excess demand. With leisure as the only initial endowment, this
means an equal value on demand of goods and sales of leisure (labour). Thus in
our interpretation, there is essentially no con￿ ict between the two claims, though
we are back to ￿rst-best with taxation of own consumption of endowments.
Auerbach Auerbach in his handbook article (1985, p. 89) clearly notes the
di⁄erence between the two types of taxation of leisure. At another place, how-
ever, he seems more sloppy. Thus in the case with an endowment of leisure
only, while we argue that one should use leisure as numeraire, as this gives the
most intuitive interpretation, he warns (on p. 90) that making leisure untaxed
leads to a ￿loss of distinction between untaxable and untaxed goods.￿As men-
tioned above, this only happens only if one does not discriminate between own
consumption of leisure (untaxable by model setup) and sale of leisure (untaxed
due to the normalisation). Then (on p. 92) in discussing the Corlett and Hague
(1953-54) rule, he states:
4Expression (5.21) [the Corlett-Hague rule] calls for a higher tax on
on the taxed good that is a complement to the numeraire. This
generated the somewhat misleading explanation that we ￿cannot￿
tax good zero, so we minimize distortions by taxing more heavily
its relative complements. Recall that the choice of untaxed good
is arbitrary, and that (5.21] applies for any numbering of the three
goods.
This is in a way correct, but suggests that there is nothing special by making
leisure untaxed. Our point is that the interpretation of the Corlett-Hague rule
only makes sense if leisure is untaxed. Taxing more heavily relative complements
with leisure makes sense, as the untaxed own consumption of leisure is the reason
for not obtaining the ￿rst-best in this model. To give an intuitive explanation
of why one should tax relative complements with an arbitrary consumer good,
taken as numeraire, on the other hand, is close to impossible. As we will see,
it is only with leisure untaxed, that we can generalize the Corlett-Hague rule,
in the sense that we get a general characterisation with essentially the same
interpretation.
Deaton Even Deaton (1981, p. 1256) seems confused about the role of nor-
malisations. Discussing the characterisation of optimal taxes (equation (14)
below) he states:
Note the special place occupied by good 0, leisure. ... the asymmetry
is due to the numeraire role of labor (or leisure). Since leisure is
untaxed, government revenue is implicitly measured in labor units
so that by taxing complements with the revenue good, taxation is
rendered easier. In general, the government will presumably wish to
purchase goods other than labor and this would lead to a di⁄erent
tax rule. For example, a king who must pay a tribute of oxen to a
neighboring conqueror would do well to levy relatively high taxes on
goods complementary with oxen.
Stern Stern (1986, p. 298) claims that ￿there have been a temptation ￿to
elevate the innocent normalization ... into something of of real substance￿ . He
then points out the error in Deatons above claim. He is, however, not quite
precise about what is going on as he states that
The crucial reason for the central role of complementarity with
leisure in the results concerning the optimum proportion of tax in
price is is that there is an endowment of leisure which cannot be
taxed in this second-best problem.
The root of the problem is as we have said that own consumption of leisure
is untaxed. That labor (sales of leisure) is untaxed is an innocent normalisa-
tion. Furthermore, the fact that normalisations are irrelevant for the solution
of the optimal taxation problem does not imply that they are irrelevant for the
characterisation of the problem.
It looks like Stern does not discriminate between the task of understand-
ing the principles of taxation and the task of solving a taxation problem. For
5the ￿rst task we need an intuitive characterisation, and for this normalisations
matter, whereas for the second task normalisations are irellevant ￿but so are
normally the characterisations. This is di⁄erent from the case with explicit ana-
lytic solutions, where one wants to arrange the solution in an easily interpretable
way.
Stern also lists some other questionable reservations against Deaton￿ s ap-
proach. One is that the symmetry between goods and factors are lost on Deatons
approach. This is true, but that symmetry is replaced by the more fundamental
one between positive and negative net trades. Another is, if I understand him
correctly, is that the duality results underlying Deaton￿ s approach presuppose
positive lump-sum income. This is wrong, as the duality results only presup-
poses positive (full) income, and this is for all practical purposes ful￿lled without
lump-som income. Finally, he claims that it is hard to measure or even de￿ne
the endowment of leisure. But the measurement of the endowment of goods is
more a problem when it comes solving an optimal taxation problem than for
understanding the principles of taxation. For the last task, I think Deatons￿ s
approach is the preferred one.
2 The optimal commodity taxation model
We use the standard optimal commodity taxation model with one price-taking
individual, except that we allow for initial endowments, x ￿ 0, of all goods.2
Assume ￿xed producer prices, p.3 With quantity taxes, t, on market trans-
actions, x ￿ x, and no lump sum tax,4 consumer prices are p = p + t, and
the income of the individual, m = m + p0x, where m = 0 is exogenously given
income. The problem for e¢ ciency is as usual that own consumption of initial
endowments is untaxed.
Assume that the public sector maximises the utility of the individual given
an exogenously given tax requirement, T. Normalise producer prices by setting
income at producer prices, p0x = 1. Then T is the tax requirement as a share of
the income at producer prices. Also let v(p;m) be the indirect utility function
and x(p;m) the demand of the individual. The governments problem is then:
V (p;m;T) = max
t
v(p;m) subject to t0 (x(p;m) ￿ x) ￿ T ￿ 0 (￿). (1)
The marginal social utility of (exogenously) income to the individual, Vm =
vm + ￿t0xm, and the marginal social utility of increasing the tax income re-
quirement, VT = ￿￿. Thus ￿ is the marginal social utility of reducing the
public tax requirement, and ￿ = (￿ ￿ Vm)=￿ is the value of transferring one
pound (exogenously) from the individual to the public. Note that all these
concepts are evaluated at consumer prices.
2We also assume a complete set of markets, price-taking actors and no pro￿t. Without
these assumptions, even the real solution to the problem might depend on the normalisation.
3This corresponds to a (constant scale) Leontief technology. The assumption of ￿xed
producer prices can be replaced with a linear technology without any consequences for the
results. The only di⁄erence is that then we also have to make the producer price normalisation
at the prices in optimum, as we do for the consumer price normalisation below.
4This is of course unrealistic. It is usually justi￿ed by saying that one are interested in
e¢ ciency results in an economy with many individuals, but this is not e¢ ciency in the Pareto
sense.
6Before characterising the solution, we discuss di⁄erent normalisations of con-
sumer prices.
3 Normalisation of consumer prices
Individual demand, x(p;m), is homogenous of degree 0 in prices and income.
With no exogenously income, m = 0, demand x(p;p0x) is homogeneous of
degree 0 in consumer prices, p. Thus we can scale (normalise) the consumer
prices, p, without a⁄ecting demand. This homogeneity is often used to set the
consumer price on one good equal to its producer price, so that the tax on this
good is 0. We illustrate the consequences of di⁄erent choices with an example.
Example 1 With a (constant scale) Leontief technology, choose units so that
all goods have producer (￿rm) price 1. Assume two goods, i = 1;2 in addition
to leisure (good 0). Also assume that with leisure untaxed (the canonical nor-
malisation, as we shall see), the tax on good 2 is larger than that on good 1, i.e.
t2 > t1. The consumer prices are then p0 = (1;1 + t1;1 + t2)
0
.
What happens if we instead choose good 2 as untaxed, by dividing consumer





1 < 1, thus we have a subsidy on good 1 and tax on good 0. The latter since
the price of leisure is smaller to the consumer than the ￿rms.
The result in the case with good 2 as untaxed is hard to interpret: To obtain our
required public revenue, it looks as if we should subsidise good 1. In contrast,
the case with leisure untaxed is more comprehensible, with two taxed goods. I
think this example already points to the importance of our ￿rst distinction. We
get brie￿ y back to this example at the end of the paper.
3.1 Equivalence results
We state three trivial and well-known equivalence results on taxation of endow-
ments (leisure). They all follow directly from the homogeneity of demand in
consumer prices, and show the importance of discriminating between the two
forms of taxation of endowments (leisure).
Proposition 2
1. An equal value tax on all consumption, x, including own consumption of
initial endowments, is equivalent to a lump sum tax.
2. An equal value tax on net trade, x ￿ x, have no e⁄ect at all.
3. A uniform tax on goods without endowments is equivalent to an uniform
tax on the sales of endowments.
In the sense of 1), the claim attributed to Dixit and Learner above is true,
whereas 2) is attributed to Sandmo above. From 3) the assumption of no tax
on labour is only seemingly a restriction on the model - at least for linear taxes.
7Proof. 1) It is easily seen from the individual￿ s budget condition which in this
case is (1+t)p0x = p0x. This budget condition can easily be rewritten as a tax








2) This is immediate from the budget condition in this case, (1+t)p0 (x￿x) = 0,
by shorting the factor 1 + t. The reason is that whereas t is a tax for goods
without initial endowments, it is a subsidy on sales of endowments, as in this
case, the price to the individual is larger than that to a ￿rm.
3) To show this, let x = (xe;x0), where xe are the goods for which the individual
holds endowments and x0 the ones without, and let p = (p
e;p0) be the corre-




x0 = pe (xe ￿ xe). Dividing by 1+t, letting the uniform
tax on labour, ￿, be de￿ned by 1 ￿ ￿ = 1=(1 + t), i.e. ￿ = t=(1 + t), the above
equation is equivalent to
￿
p0￿0
x0 = (1￿￿)pe (xe ￿ xe), thus the uniform tax t
on non-endowed goods is equivalent to the uniform tax, ￿, on the endowments.
It is also easy to verify that the tax income is the same in each case with
the two tax forms in the three cases.
4 Characterising optimal commodity taxes
As mentioned, we postpone the consumer price normalisation, to get a clearer
view of it￿ s e⁄ect.
The ￿rst order condition of our taxation problem, (1), with respect to the
tax rates, t, is
vp + ￿(x ￿ x + t0xp) = 0.
With initial endowments, Roy￿ s theorem and the Slutsky equation are vp =
￿vm(x￿x) and xp = xH
p ￿xm(x￿x)0, where xH is the compensated demand.
Inserting from this into the ￿rst-order condition gives
￿vm(x ￿ x) + ￿
￿
x ￿ x + t0 ￿
xH
p ￿ xm(x ￿ x)
￿￿
= 0:
Collecting the terms with x ￿ x, dividing by ￿ and inserting for Vm and ￿, we
get the Ramsey rule:
￿(x￿x)
0 + t0xH
p = 0. (2)
Compared to the standard case with leisure as the only endowment, and where
consumer prices is normalised by setting the tax on labour to zero, we addition-
ally gets the term ￿￿x.6
A direct interpretation of the Ramsey rule is that an equal relative increase
in all tax rates (at optimum) should give an equal relative reduction in the
compensated quantity of all non-endowed goods.7 This interpretation, however,
does not convey much information about the implied taxes rates as these are
quite implicit in the characterisation. But some stronger assumptions gives
simpler interpretations.
5With our normalisation, income at producer prices, p0x = 1.
6Replacing compensated demand, xH, by compensated excess demand, zH = xH ￿ x, we
get exactly the same condition as in the standard case.
7The characterisation gets somewhat more complex for endowed goods.
8The (compensated) inverse elasticity rule Assume that leisure (good 0) is
the only endowment, and no compensated cross price elasticities between goods,
except towards leisure. Then Ramsey rule, (2), gives the inverse elasticity rule












The ￿rst form of this rule is mostly used, but the second gives the best inter-
pretation. It says that one should tax relative complements to leisure harder.
We come back to this important interpretation in section 4.2.
The Corlett-Hague rule Assume that leisure (good 0) is the only endow-
ment and that there are only two other goods. In this case, the Ramsey rule,















On the right hand side, only the middle terms are di⁄erent. Thus the interpre-
tation is again that we should tax relative complements to leisure harder.10
The importance of the common interpretation of the second form of the in-
verse elasticity rule and the Corlett-Hague rule is argued by Sandmo (1987).
The argument below, essentially due to Deaton (1979), gives a general charac-
terisation of optimal commodity taxes with the same intuitive interpretation.
Thus the argument outdates Sandmo￿ s (1976, p. 46) remark: ￿Elasticity for-
mulae become very complicated in the general case and provide little intuitive
insight into the structure of taxation.￿
4.1 Inverting the Ramsey rule
We use the Antonelli matrix, which is the derivative of the (compensated) mar-
ginal willingness to pay function, to invert the Ramsey rule. First, however, we
recall these concepts.
4.1.1 The (compensated) marginal willingness to pay
First introduce prices, q = p=p0x, scaled so that income is one. With these
prices, q, the indirect utility function can be written U￿(q) = v(p=p0x;1).
The (compensated) willingness to pay function (or indirect expenditure func-




q0x subject to U￿(q) ￿ u ￿ 0:
8Here Elba = (b=a)(da=db) is the elasticity of a with respect to b.
9Dalton and Sadka (1979) gives a more direct generalisation of the Corlett-Hague rule than
the one by Deaton which we advocate, but in their case there are still only two taxed goods.
10In contrast to the assumptions of the inverse elasticity rule, the assumptions of the Corlett-
Hague rule allows complements to leisure.
11Deaton actually use the equivalent distance function instead, but the willingness to pay
function is more intuitive.
9It is easy to show that this function has the same properties (in x) as the
exprenditure function (in p). The solution to this problem, qH(x;u), is the
(compensated) marginal willingness to pay for x (given utility level u) or the
(compensated) inverse demand for x. By the envelope property, e￿
x(x;u) =
qH(x;u). We draw a picture of the problem with the given level curve U￿(q) = u
in grey. With prices on the axes, utility is increasing towards origin in the
diagram:
The (compensated) willingness to pay function is concave, homogenous of degree
1, and nondecreasing in x, and additionally continuous for x ￿ 0.
Compensated demand, xH(p;u), and compensated inverse demand, qH(x;u),






This relation says that given prices p, with expenditure 1 to reach utility level
u, we get back to p by ￿rst taking the compensated demand at these prices,
and then the compensated marginal willingness to pay, given this demand. If
expenditure to reach utility level u is di⁄erent from 1, we only get back to
original prices, scaled to expenditure 1.
Taking the derivative of the above expression wrt. prices p, we get that the
Slutsky matrix, xH
p , and the Antonelli matrix, qH
x , are generalised inverses, i.e.
(p0x)qH
x xH
p = I ￿ xq0, (6)
where I is the identity matrix.
4.1.2 The inverse Ramsey rule
Let ￿ = ￿p0x.13 Right multiplying the Ramsey rule, (2), with p0x times the An-
tonelli matrix, qH
x , using the generalized inverse property, (6), and the de￿nition





x = t0(I ￿ xq
0).
As qH(x;u) is homogenous of degree 0 in quantities x, qH
x x = 0. Hence,
x0qH
x = 0, since qH
x is symmetric. Inserting from the public budget constraint,
t0(x￿x) = T, we get the (unnormalised) inverse Ramsey rule:14
t0 = (T + t0x)q0 + ￿x0qH
x . (7)
12A simple proof is given in an appendix. Another proof of (6) below is given in Salvas-
Bronsard, Leblanc and Bronsard (1977).
13We get back to the interpretation of ￿.
14This is essentially Auerbach￿ s (1987) formula (6.6). Thus, so far there is nothing new.
10Before proceeding, we introduce some de￿nitions.
4.1.3 Endowment elasticities







k (￿x + (1 ￿ ￿)x;u)
@￿
j￿=1 .
This is the elasticity of the (compensated) marginal willingness to pay for good
k with respect to an adjustment of consumption (from the optimum x) in the
direction of the endowments, x.15























= qkxk be the income share of good k, evaluated at the marginal
willingness to pay at optimum, and ￿￿ =
P
j ￿j￿j the average (compensated)
endowment elasticity, with the income share weights.
4.1.4 More on ￿
Right multiplying (7) by x, using that q0x = 1, we get an expression for the
marginal value of transferring one pound (exogenously) from the individual to






The quadratic form in the denominator of (9), however, equals the average






































15In the standard case with an endowment only of leisure, the endowment elasticity of a
good is simply the elastisity of the (compensated) marginal willingness to pay for that good
wrt. the quantity of leisure.
16The inequality follows as e￿(x;u) is concave i x, thus qH
x is negative semide￿nit.
11The marginal e¢ ciency loss of taxation We saw above that ￿ is the value
of transferring one pound exogenously, at consumer prices, from the individual
to the government. Then ￿ = ￿p0x is the value of transferring one pound
exogenously, at producer prices, from the individual to the government. This is
so, since with our producer price normalisation, the income at producer prices,
m = p0x = 1, while income at consumer prices, m = p0x. Thus m = p0xm, so
dm=dm = p0x.
By its interpretation, ￿ looks like a natural measure of the marginal e¢ ciency
loss of taxation. As pointed out by H￿konsen (1998), however, this is problem-
atic, as one would like such a measure to be independent of the consumer price
normalisation, and ￿ is not.17 But, as seen from (9), ￿ is independent of the
consumer price normalisation. Therefore, ￿ is a measure of the marginal e¢ -
ciency loss of taxation. Again, with our (canonical) normalisation below, ￿ = ￿,
so with this normalisation, ￿ also is a measure of the marginal e¢ ciency loss of
taxation.
4.2 The normalisation and inverse characterisation
We are now ready for our (canonical) normalisation, being a straightforward
generalisation of the standard practice with leisure as the only endowment, and
untaxed labour.
Normalise consumer prices by setting income at the optimal consumer prices
equal to one, p0x = 1. Then, at optimum, the initial endowments are a nontaxed
(composite) good, i.e. t0x = 0. Then also p = q, and (7) simpli￿es to the inverse
Ramsey rule:
t0 = Tp0 + ￿x0qH
x . (11)
On component form, (11) is:



















Thus the public tax requirement (as a share of income at producer prices) is a
basic tax rate. Deviations from this base tax rate is for each good proportional
to its endowment elasticity.
Call a good k an endowment substitute if ￿k < 0, and an endowment com-
plement if ￿k > 0. The basis tax rate should then be raised for endowment
complements and lowered for endowment substitutes.18 The intuition is clear:
A tax on own consumption of endowments removes the e¢ ciency loss. Thus a
tax on endowment complements is an indirect way of taxing own consumption
of endowments, thereby reducing the e¢ ciency loss. Taxing endowment substi-
tutes, on the other hand, only increases the own use of untaxed endowments.
17H￿konsen then proceeds to de￿ne the (total) e¢ ciency loss by means of a pair of dual
optimal value functions for the optimization problem.
18With only endowments of one good, this is essentially Hicks￿ (1956) notions of q-
compements and q-substitutes with respect to this good.
12This is of course the same intuition as one get both from the second form of the
inverse elasticity rule, (3), and the Corlett and Hague rule, (4), above. It does,
however, avoid the restrictive assumptions of both these characterisations.














In this characterisation especially the term for the tax value of endowments, t0x,
is hard to interpret, as the other new term, (p0x)
￿1, is only a proportionality
factor. In example 1, it is this term which explains why we get negative tax rate
under the last normalisation, as it is negative.
Our generalised inverse elasticity rule, (12), is simpler and easier to interpret
than the similar formula (6.7) in Auerbach (1985), which is essentially of the
form (13) (although he does not introduce the endowment elasticities), obtained
by setting an arbitrary tax rate equal to 0. Our (canonical) normalisation, how-
ever, looks like the obvious choice at this point. Thus I suspect that the reason
Auerbach does not use the normalisation is that he thinks it is illegitimate.
Remark 3 Auerbach gets around the problems caused by the tax value of en-
dowments, by looking at the di⁄erences between the relative tax rates in his










￿￿￿￿ (￿k ￿ ￿j) v ￿k ￿ ￿j.
Then, however, i.e. the interpretation of T as the base tax rate is lost.
Remark 4 Normally, one normalise before solving the problem. This is not
possible in our case, as we normalise income by setting income at the optimal
consumer prices to 1. But this is unproblematic as the point of the normalisation
is to characterise the solution, i.e. helping us understand it, and not to solve
the problem.
4.2.1 Only one endowment
With endowments of only one good, 0 (say leisure), from (8) using symmetry,
the (compensated) endowment elasticity of good is the elasticity of (compen-













In this case ￿0 = 1. Thus from the de￿nition:

















19This is Deaton￿ s (1979) formula (51).
13The departure of the tax rate on good k from the base tax rate is for each good
proportional to the (compensated) elasticity of the marginal willingness to pay
wrt. the price of leisure.
A comparison The generalized inverse elasticity rule in this case, (14) is sim-
ilar to the second form of the inverse elasticity rule, (3), except that it involves
the elasticity of the (compensated) marginal willingness to pay (i.e. inverse
demand) wrt. leisure, whereas the standard inverse elasticity rule involves the
inverse of the elasticity of (compensated) demand with respect to the price of
leisure.
A The generalized inverse property
Here, we verify the generalized inverse property used in the main text, using
the duality between the compensated direct and compensated indirect demand.
We state the basic result for demand correspondences, with respect to income
normalized prices and quantities.
Given a utility level u, de￿ne the compensated demand correspondence, cu,
by x 2 cu(q) if qx ￿ 1, U(x) ￿ u and for all x0 such that U(x0) ￿ u, qx0 ￿ 1,
and the compensated inverse demand correspondence, c￿u, by q 2 c￿u(x) if
qx ￿ 1, U￿(q) ￿ u and and for all q0 such that U￿(q) ￿ u, q0x ￿ 1. The
following straightforward proposition states that the two concepts are dual in a
simple way.
Proposition 5 Assume monotone preferences. Then x 2 cu(q) if and only if
q 2 c￿u(x).
Proof. ): Assume x 2 cu(q). To show that q 2 c￿u(x). Trivially qx ￿ 1,
so we need to show ￿rst that U￿(q) ￿ u and secondly that if U(q0) ￿ u, then
q0x ￿ 0.
1. Assume U￿(q) > u. Then since U￿(q) = supx fU(x)jqx ￿ 1g, there is x0
such that U(x0) > u and qx0 ￿ 1. Hence by monotonicity there is x00 such
that U(x00) > u and qx00 < 1, contradicting x 2 cu(q).
2. Let U(q0) ￿ u, and assume that q0x > 1. Then by monotonicity, there is
q00 such that U(q00) < u and q00x > 1. Since U(x) = infq fU￿(q)jqx ￿ 1g,
then U(x) ￿ U(q00) < U(q) = u, contradicting x 2 cu(q).
(: This is essentially the same argument.
If both the above correspondences are single-valued, we essentially have the
compensated demand and inverse demand functions, xH(q;u) and qH(x;u),
ie. x 2 cu(q) can be written x = xH(q;u) and q 2 c￿u(x) can be written
q = qH(x;u). In this case, a consequence of the proposition is the generalised
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